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ABSTRACT
We propose a regression discontinuity design which can be employed when assignment to treat-
ment is determined by an ordinal variable. The proposal first requires estimating an ordered
probit model for the ordinal running variable. The estimated probability of being assigned
to treatment is then adopted as a latent continuous running variable and used to identify a
covariate-balanced subsample around the threshold. Assuming local unconfoundedness of the
treatment in the subsample, an estimate of the effect of the program is obtained by employ-
ing a weighted estimator of the average treatment effect. Three types of balancing weights—
overlap weights, inverse probability weights and ATT weights—are considered. An empirical
M-estimator for the variance of the weighting estimator is derived. We apply the method to
evaluate the causal effect of the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme of the European Cen-
tral Bank on bond spreads.
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gression discontinuity design, weighting
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1 Introduction
Regression discontinuity (RD) design is a quasi-experimental design for causal inference. In
the conventional sharp RD setting, the treatment status is a deterministic step function of a
pretreatment variable, commonly referred to as the running variable. All units with a realized
value of the running variable on one side of a pre-fixed threshold are assigned to one regime
and all units on the other side are assigned to the other regime. The basic idea of RD is that one
can compare units with similar values of the running variable, but different levels of treatment,
to draw causal inference of the treatment at or around the threshold. First introduced in 1960
(Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960), RD has become increasingly popular since the late 1990s
in economics and policy, with many influential applications (e.g., Angrist and Krueger, 1991;
Imbens and van der Klaauw, 1995; Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Lee, 2001; van der Klaauw, 2002,
among others).
In the standard RD setting, the running variable is continuous; one usually assumes con-
tinuity (namely, potential outcomes are continuous functions of the running variable at the
threshold), and then employs local linear regressions or polynomials to extrapolate the coun-
terfactual potential outcome under the opposite treatment status and estimate the causal effects
at the threshold (Hahn et al., 2001; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). A recent strand of research
instead contends that RD designs lead to locally randomized experiments around the thresh-
old (Lee, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Building on this interpretation, several recent works
provide formal identification conditions and inferential strategies to estimate the causal effects
(e.g., Cattaneo et al., 2015; Li et al., 2015).
RD methods have been mostly developed in the context of continuous running variables.
However, in many empirical applications, assignment to treatment is determined by covari-
ates which are inherently discrete or only take on a limited number of values (Lee and Card,
2008; Kolesa´r and Rothe, 2017). A categorical running variable poses challenges for RD esti-
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mation for two reasons. First, RD estimation involves measuring the distance of each unit to
the threshold. When the running variable is categorical, ordered or not, values of the running
variable provide little information on the distance to the threshold. Consequently, one can no
longer compare outcomes within arbitrarily small neighborhoods of the threshold to identify
the causal effects, and thus has to account for the uncertainty about the relationship between the
running variable and the outcomes (Lee and Card, 2008). Second, if the number of categories
is small, even considering only units in the two categories bordering the threshold may lead
to misleading results, particularly when the units within the two categories differ considerably
from each other. Indeed, existing literature provides limited insights on how to apply RD tech-
niques in such settings. Lee and Card (2008) assume a parametric functional form relating the
outcome to the running variable and account for the uncertainty in the choice of this functional
form. Dong (2015) considers a setting in which the running variable is discrete due to round-
ing; the author shows that in this case standard RD estimation leads to biased estimates of the
average treatment effect and provides formulas to correct for this discretization bias.
Two recent works shed further light on the issues related to discrete running variables.
Kolesa´r and Rothe (2017) show that the confidence intervals proposed by Lee and Card (2008)
have poor coverage properties and suggest to calculate alternative confidence intervals under
suitable restrictions on the functional form of the relationship between the outcome and the run-
ning variable. Imbens and Wager (2018) propose a general optimization-based approach that
minimizes the worst-case conditional mean-squared error among all linear estimators, which is
applicable to both continuous and discrete running variables. However, these recent advances
are not directly applicable to problems in which the running variable is ordinal, rather than
discretized from an underlying continuous variable.
In this paper we develop a framework for conducting RD inference when the running vari-
able is ordered categorical. Our methodological innovation is motivated by our interest in
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the evaluation of the European Central Bank’s Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP),
which illustrates the challenges posed by ordinal running variables in a RD context. The CSPP
entails the acquisition of corporate bonds, with the aim of strengthening the pass-through of un-
conventional monetary policy measures to the financing conditions of the real economy. Under
the CSPP, the Eurosystem purchases investment-grade bonds issued by non-bank corporations.
Cast into a RD framework, the assignment to treatment in the CSPP is determined by an ordinal
running variable, the rating of the bond. Specifically, only bonds with an investment-grade rat-
ing (i.e., BBB+ or above) receive the treatment, taking the form of being eligible for purchase
by the Eurosystem.
The rating of a bond is determined by the financial strength of its issuer and bond-specific
characteristics. This observation motivates us to develop a new approach in which we quantify
the distance of each unit to the threshold in terms of a continuous latent variable which deter-
mines the assignment of each unit to a category. That is, we use supplementary pretreatment
information to estimate a latent continuous running variable. Specifically, we adopt the local
randomization perspective to RD design and propose a three-step procedure with several new
features. First, we postulate an ordered probit model for the ordinal running variable, i.e., the
bond rating, employing as predictors issuer and bond characteristics, and take the estimated
probability of being assigned an investment-grade rating as the surrogate continuous running
variable. Second, based on the estimated probability, we identify a subset of units in which
the covariates in the treatment and control groups are similar. Third, within such a subset, we
invoke a local unconfoundedness assumption and use the estimated probability to construct a
weighted sample to estimate the causal effect of the treatment. The weighted sample repre-
sents a population of interest, namely units which could conceivably have been assigned to
either treatment status. This is the population which we consider to be close to the threshold.
This strategy is similar to propensity score weighting in causal inference (Hahn, 1998; Hirano
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and Imbens, 2001; Hirano et al., 2003; Li et al., 2018), which, to our knowledge, has not been
previously discussed in the RD literature. We also derive an M-estimator for the variance of the
causal effect that incorporates the uncertainty arising from both the design and analysis stages.
2 Methods
2.1 Basic setup and assumptions
We proceed under the potential outcomes framework to causal inference (Rubin, 1974; Imbens
and Rubin, 2015). Consider a sample of N units indexed by i = 1, . . . , N drawn from a
super-population Ω. Let Ri : {r1, r2, ..., rj, ..., rJ} be the ordinal running variable with J
categories and rj > rj−l for any integer 1 ≤ l ≤ (j − 1). Based on Ri, a binary treatment
Zi is assigned according to a RD rule: if a unit has a value of Ri falling above (or below,
depending on the specific application) a pre-specified threshold, rt, then that unit is assigned
to treatment; otherwise, that unit is assigned to control. That is, the treatment status is given
by Zi = 1(Ri ≥ rt), where 1(·) is the indicator function. For each unit, besides the running
variable, a set of pretreatment covariatesXi is also observed. Each unit has a potential outcome
Yi(zi) corresponding to each treatment level zi = 0, 1, and only the one corresponding to the
observed treatment status Yi = Yi(zi) is observed. Define the propensity score e(xi) as the
probability of unit i receiving the treatment conditional on the covariates: e(xi) ≡ Pr(Zi =
1|Xi = xi) = Pr(Ri ≥ rt|Xi = xi).
For valid causal inference, we focus on the subpopulations whose units all have non-zero
probability of being assigned to either treatment condition. Formally, we make the assumption
of local overlap.
Assumption 1 (Local overlap) There exists a subpopulation Ωo ⊂ Ω such that, for each i in
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Ωo, we have 0 < e(Xi) < 1.
Within the subpopulation Ωo, we further make the following two assumptions.
Assumption 2 (Local SUTVA) For each unit i in Ωo, consider two realizations of the running
variable r′i and r
′′
i with possibly r
′
i 6= r′′i . If z′i = z′′i , that is, if either r′i ≤ rt and r′′i ≤ rt, or
r
′
i > rt and r
′′
i > rt, then Yi(z
′
i) = Yi(z
′′
i ), irrespective of the realized value of the running
variable rj for any other unit j 6= i in Ωo.
Assumption 3 (Local unconfoundedness) For each unit i in Ωo, the treatment assignment is
unconfounded givenXi: Pr(Zi|Yi(1), Yi(0),Xi) = Pr(Zi|Xi).
Local SUTVA implies (i) the absence of interference between units, and (ii) independence of
the potential outcome on the running variable given the treatment status for the same unit. Lo-
cal unconfoundedness forms the basis for causal inference under RD: it entails the existence of
a subpopulation around the threshold for which the assignment to treatment is unconfounded
given the observed pretreatment variables. We will elaborate on the selection of this subpopu-
lation in Section 2.2.3. Local unconfoundedness extends the local randomization assumption
in Lee and Card (2008), and is similar to the bounded conditional independence assumption
in Angrist and Rokkanen (2012). As explained by Lee and Card (2008, p. 655), the local
randomization assumption means that “it may be plausible to think that treatment status is ‘as
good as randomly assigned’ among the subsample of observations that fall just above and just
below the threshold.” For instance, suppose that a policy grants a sum of money to households
when their income (i.e., a continuous running variable) is below a given threshold. Local ran-
domization means that for each household with an income level inside a small window around
the threshold the observed income is assumed to be governed by chance. Given that the prob-
ability to enter this window around the threshold depends on household characteristics (e.g.,
households with high level of education and wealth plausibly have much less probability to
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have an income in an interval around the threshold compared to households with low level of
education and wealth) and given the continuity of the running variable, the local randomization
assumption implies that, for each unit in the window, the probability to observe a value of in-
come above the threshold is 0.5 in the limit. Our local unconfoundedness assumption extends
the local randomization assumption by allowing the probability to be assigned to the treatment
to depart from 0.5 and to depend on the pretreatment variables (education and wealth in this
example). Therefore, relaxation of the local randomization hypothesis allows us to enlarge the
subsample of units around the threshold for which randomization can be assumed to hold, given
that it lets units for which the probability progressively departs from 0.5 enter the subsample.
However, our unconfoundedness assumption is still “local” in nature: indeed, we maintain the
RD hypothesis according to which, for each unit in the population, treatment assignment also
depends on the unobserved units’ characteristics. As a result, the interval around the threshold
for which the unconfoundedness hypothesis holds has to be bounded.
2.2 Design and analysis
The key to our proposal is to treat the probability Pr(Ri = rj|Xi) as a latent continuous running
variable instead of using the observed category Ri as an ordinal running variable. Under this
perspective, we will define the causal estimand as a weighted average treatment effect on a
subpopulation with particular policy interest, namely, the overlap population.
Our estimation strategy consists of three steps. First, we fit an ordered probit model for the
ordinal running variable conditional on the observed covariates and take the estimated proba-
bility of being assigned to treatment as the latent continuous running variable. Second, based
on the estimated probability, we identify a subset of units in which the local unconfoundedness
assumption is plausible by checking the covariate balance. Third, within this subpopulation,
we estimate the average treatment effect for the target population.
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2.2.1 Probit model for the ordered running variable
We postulate an ordered probit model for the distribution of the ordered running variable,
Pr(Ri = rj|Xi = xi), and consequently for the propensity score e(Xi). Specifically, we
assume that each unit’s observed category Ri is determined by a latent normally distributed
variable R∗i as follows:
R∗i = Xiβ + Ui, Ui ∼ N(0, 1) (1)
and
Ri =

r1, if R∗i ≤ µ1,
rj, if µj−1 < R∗i ≤ µj,
rJ , if R∗i > µJ−1,
(2)
where µj ∈ {µ0, µ1, . . . , µJ−1, µJ} is a series of cutoff points, with µ0 = −∞ and µJ = ∞.
That is, Ri falls in category rj when the latent variable R∗i falls in the interval between rj−1 and
rj . A probit model for Ri is plausible in contexts where the category classifies units by ordered
levels of “quality”, which can be for example the grade a student achieves in a subject, or in
our case the credit quality of a bond. In these examples, the quality of a unit is supposed to be a
continuous variable (e.g., the student’s level of knowledge in a subject, or the issuer’s capacity
to honor its debts) we cannot observe, but for which we can observe the interval where it falls.
Based on the ordered probit model (1)–(2), we have
Pr(Ri = rj|Xi = xi) = Pr(µj−1 < R∗i ≤ µj) = Φ(µj − xiβ)− Φ(µj−1 − xiβ).
The ordered probit model belongs to the class of generalized linear models suitable for
ordinal responses. The link function is the inverse of the normal CDF, which implies that
the probability of response is a monotonic function of the linear transformation xiβ (Agresti,
2013), namely, for any x1 and x2, Pr(Ri ≤ rj|Xi = x1) ≤ Pr(Ri ≤ rj|Xi = x2) when
x1β > x2β. Given the deterministic relationship Zi = 1(Ri ≥ rt), the monotonicity also
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holds for the propensity score e(xi). Therefore, we expect the estimated propensity scores,
eˆ(xi), to be close to 1 for units for which we observe high values of Ri, while being close to 0
for units for which we observe low values of Ri.
Moreover, given the monotonicity of e(xi) in xiβ, and provided thatXi is a good predictor
of the ordinal responses, we expect the average eˆ(xi) to be below 0.5 for units whose value
of Ri is just below the threshold rt, i.e.,
∑
i 1(Ri = rt−1)eˆ(Xi)/
∑
i 1(Ri = rt−1) < 0.5,
and above or equal to 0.5 for units whose value of Ri is at the threshold rt, i.e.,
∑
i 1(Ri =
rt)eˆ(Xi)/
∑
i 1(Ri = rt) ≥ 0.5. Therefore, values of the propensity score around 0.5 pertain
to units which fall in categories around the threshold. These units form a target population of
policy interest because they can be assigned with non-negligible probability to either treatment
condition and therefore are the mostly affected by, even small, changes in the policy. This
target population can be formally defined using the concept of “overlap weights”, as described
in Section 2.2.2.
In practice, a well-specified ordered probit model would produce in-sample predictions of
e(xi) that satisfy the above patterns, which can be verified by inspecting the box plots of the
estimated Pr(Ri = rj|Xi = xi) in each category of the observed running variable.
2.2.2 Causal estimands
Within a subpopulation Ω0 where Assumptions 1–3 hold, we can define a class of average
treatment effects estimands, each corresponding to a different target population. To formalize,
we assume that the marginal distribution of the pretreatment variablesXi in Ω0, Q(xi), exists.
Denote the density of the pretreatment variables Xi in the entire, treated and control popu-
lation in Ω0 by f(xi), f1(xi), f0(xi), respectively. Representing the target population density
by f(xi)h(xi), where h(xi) is pre-specified function of xi, we can define a general class of
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weighted average treatment effect (WATE) estimands (Hirano et al., 2003):
τh ≡
∫
E[Y (1)− Y (0)|xi]f(xi)h(xi)dQ(xi)∫
f(xi)h(xi)dQ(xi)
. (3)
It is easy to show that for any h(xi),
f(xi)h(xi) = f1(xi)h(xi)/e(xi) = f0(xi)h(xi)/(1− e(xi)).
This implies that applying the balancing weights—w1(xi) = h(xi)/e(xi) for the treated units
and w0(xi) = h(xi)/(1−e(xi)) for the controls—balances the distribution of the pretreatment
variables between the treatment groups, and thus enables inferring the causal effect τh defined
on the target population f(xi)h(xi). A consistent moment estimator of τh is the sample differ-
ence in the weighted average outcomes between treatment groups
τˆh =
∑
iw1(Xi)ZiYi∑
iw1(Xi)Zi
−
∑
iw0(Xi)(1− Zi)Yi∑
iw0(Xi)(1− Zi)
. (4)
Among the general class of balancing weights, of particular relevance to our application
is the overlap weights (Li et al., 2018), (w0 = e(xi), w1 = 1 − e(xi)), corresponding to
h(xi) = e(xi)(1−e(xi)), the maximum of which is attained at e(xi) = 0.5. This defines a tar-
get population whose pretreatment characteristics could appear with substantial probability in
either treatment group, i.e., with the most overlap in covariates. The corresponding causal esti-
mand τh is called the average treatment effect for the overlap population (ATO). Arguably, the
overlap population consists of the units whose treatment assignment might be most responsive
to a policy shift as new information is obtained. In our RD framework, this overlap popu-
lation is exactly the subpopulation around the threshold: with overlap weights, the units are
smoothly downweighted as their latent running variable moves away from the threshold, i.e.,
e(xi) = 0.5. Crump et al. (2006) and Li et al. (2018) show that the overlap weights lead to the
minimal asymptotic variance of τˆh among all h(·) functions under mild regularity conditions.
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Other two estimands relevant to our application are the average treatment effect (ATE) and
the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT). The ATE corresponds to h(xi) = 1 and the
balancing weight w0 = 1/(1 − e(xi)), w1 = 1/e(xi), while for the ATT h(xi) = e(xi) and
w0 = e(xi)/(1−e(xi)), w1 = 1. Though the ATE and ATT do not have a natural connection to
the ordinal RD setting here, they are estimands of common interest in the economics literature
and we will compare them with the ATO in our empirical application.
2.2.3 Select the subpopulation
An important issue in practice is how to select the subpopulation Ω0 where Assumption 3
holds. There can be many choices of the shape of the subpopulation. Following the convention
in the literature, we first focus on the symmetric intervals around the threshold: (0.5 − d) <
eˆ(xi) < (0.5 + d). To select the bandwidth d, we adopt the idea of balancing tests (Cattaneo
et al., 2015; Cattaneo and Vazquez-Bare, 2016). Specifically, given the “local” nature of As-
sumption 3, we expect the pretreatment covariates to be balanced between treatment groups
close to the threshold, but the balance will break down when moving away from the thresh-
old. Therefore, starting from a small d, we check the covariate balance of units in the interval
(0.5 − d) < eˆ(xi) < (0.5 + d) and gradually increase d until significant imbalance is de-
tected. The “optimal” bandwidth will be set to the maximum d such that the covariates are
balanced. We also consider subpopulations defined by asymmetric intervals. This allows us
to find covariate-balanced subsamples with a larger number of units. As a result, asymmetric
intervals allow us to increase the external validity of our findings.
2.2.4 Variance estimation
We derive an M-estimation-based sandwich variance estimator (Huber, 1964; van der Vaart,
1998; Stefanski and Boos, 2002) of the moment estimator (4), which accounts for the uncer-
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tainty in estimating the propensities from the ordered probit model (2) (outline of the deriva-
tion is given in the Appendix). Denote the parameter vector in the ordered probit model as
η = (µ1, · · · , µJ−1,βT )T . The empirical M-estimation variance of τˆh with the overlap weights
calculated from the ordered probit model is (nθˆ)−2
∑N
i=1 Iˆ
2
i , where θˆ = N
−1∑N
i=1 eˆ(Xi)(1−
eˆ(Xi)),
Iˆi = Zi(Yi − τˆ1)(1− eˆ(Xi))− (1− Zi)(Yi − τˆ0)eˆ(Xi)− HˆTη Eˆ−1ηηSi(ηˆ)
Hˆη = N
−1
N∑
i=1
[Zi(Yi − τˆ1) + (1− Zi)(Yi − τˆ0)]eηˆ(Xi),
(5)
and Eˆ−1ηη is the information matrix of ηˆ, Si(ηˆ) is the individual contribution to the gradient of
the log-likelihood function and eη = ∂e(Xi)/∂η = ( ∂e∂µ1 , · · · , ∂e∂µJ−1 , ∂e∂βT )T is the gradient of
the propensity score.
3 The Corporate Sector Purchase Programme
On March 10, 2016, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced the Corporate Sector Pur-
chase Programme (CSPP). The CSPP consists of purchases of investment-grade corporate
bonds issued by euro-area non-bank corporations, and is a part of the ECB’s expanded Asset
Purchase Programme (APP). The purchases can occur both in the primary and the secondary
market. In order to be eligible for purchase under the CSPP, debt instruments issued must sat-
isfy the following conditions: (i) have a remaining maturity between 6 months and 31 years at
the time of purchase; (ii) be denominated in euro; (iii) have a minimum first-best credit assess-
ment of at least rating of BBB- or equivalent (i.e., investment-grade) obtained from an external
and independent credit assessment institution; (iv) provide a yield to maturity, which can also
be negative, above the deposit facility rate.
In addition, the bond issuer has to comply with the following requirements: (i) is a corpo-
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ration established in the euro area; (ii) is not a credit institution supervised under the Single
Supervisory Mechanism; (iii) does not have a parent undertaking that is also a credit insti-
tution; (iv) is not an investment firm, an asset management vehicle or a national asset man-
agement fund created in order to support financial sector restructuring; (v) has not issued an
asset-backed security, a ‘multi cedula’ or a structured covered bond; (vi) must not have a parent
company which is under banking supervision inside or outside the euro area, and must not be
a subsidiary of a supervised entity or a supervised group; (vii) is not an eligible issuer for the
Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP).
There are a few earlier works analyzing the CSPP. Zaghini (2019) assesses the effects of
the program in the context of the primary bond market, by controlling for many possible de-
terminants of bond spreads. Looking instead at the secondary market, Abidi and Flores (2017)
employ differences in credit rating standards between investors and the ECB to shed light on
the market’s reaction to the announcement of the program. We complement these works by
providing estimates of the effect of the program which rely on a formal statistical framework
of causal inference.
4 Empirical application
We employ the methods proposed in Section 2 to evaluate the effects of the CSPP on bond
spreads in the primary market. More specifically, we assess how the eligibility for purchase
under the CSPP affects bond spreads at the time of their issuance. We define the treatment as
the eligibility for purchase rather than the actual purchase of the bond for the following rea-
sons. First, purchases under the CSPP are not pre-announced, making it impossible for market
participants to react to them. Second, given that most eligible bonds issued after the program
was announced have been purchased by the Eurosystem, market participants are likely to take
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the eligibility for purchase into consideration when pricing a bond at its issuance. Indeed, of
the 346 eligible bonds that we ultimately use in our analysis, more than 85 per cent had been
purchased by the Eurosystem as of the time of writing (January 26, 2018). Finally, due to the
relatively low liquidity of the secondary bond market, the effect of the actual purchase can be
expected to be highly bond-specific and potentially only short-lived. Any permanent effect of
the program on spreads of eligible bonds is, instead, likely to be largely observed already at
issuance. Defining the treatment in this manner implies that its effect can be evaluated using a
sharp RD design.
Having defined the treatment as the eligibility for purchase, we classify all bonds whose
highest rating is equal to or greater than BBB- as treated units and the remaining bonds as
control units. It should be pointed out that this does not imply that the treatment is equivalent
to being assigned an investment-grade rating. This is due to the fact that market participants
employ either the average or the minimum rating to identify investment-grade bonds (Abidi and
Flores, 2017). Therefore, the threshold employed by market participants is above that defining
eligibility for purchase under the CSPP.
4.1 Data
We employ two sources of proprietary data. First, we obtained from Bloomberg all the corpo-
rate bonds satisfying the eligibility criteria of the program with the exception of that pertaining
to ratings, and issued between March 10, 2016 and September 30, 2017. The choice of the start
date is motivated by the fact that already when the program was announced it became known
that only investment-grade bonds would be eligible for purchase. A total of 899 such bonds
were found. We consider bonds issued after the program was announced as we wish to focus
on the primary market. This is motivated by the relatively low liquidity of the secondary cor-
porate bond markets in Europe (Biais et al., 2006; Gu¨ndu¨z et al., 2017), rendering secondary
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market quotes noisy indicators of going prices. Primary market prices, on the contrary, provide
accurate information about the market valuation of bonds at the time of their issuance.
For each bond, we obtained from Bloomberg the following information: International Se-
curities Identification Number (ISIN), coupon rate (cpn), maturity type, issue date, original
maturity (mat), amount sold, coupon type, rating at issuance by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s,
Fitch and DBRS along with its option-adjusted spread. Maturity type refers to any embedded
options the bond contains (callable, putable, convertible) or it being a bullet bond (at matu-
rity). Coupon type is one of the following: fixed, zero-coupon, pay-in-kind or variable. The
option-adjusted spread (OAS) compares the yield to maturity of the bond to the yield to ma-
turity of a government bond with a similar maturity, and further accounts for any embedded
option features of the bond. For the OAS, the first available value between the issue date and
the subsequent eight days was employed. We also obtained from Bloomberg the country of
incorporation and the industry (as given by the Bloomberg Industry Classification System) of
the issuer of each bond. Due to the difficulty of comparing bonds with variable coupon rates to
fixed rate bonds, we excluded the former (6 bonds) from the analysis.
We illustrate, in Figure 1, how the option-adjusted spreads vary across bonds issued during
the program with different ratings (right in each pair). For the sake of comparison, the distri-
butions of the OAS are presented also for bonds issued before the announcement of the CSPP,
between March 13, 2014 and March 9, 2016. This time frame was chosen to obtain a simi-
lar number of bonds as in the program data. For all rating categories, apart from the highest
two, the option-adjusted spreads were lower during the program than before it. A particularly
notable difference is observed for the lowest investment-grade category, BBB-.
The second source of data that we employ is S&P Capital IQ, from which we obtained
balance sheet (BS) and income statement (IS) data for the bond issuers. More specifically, we
first identified the ultimate parent company of each subsidiary issuer. Then, for these ultimate
15
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Figure 1: OAS by rating, before (left in each pair) and during the program.
parents and the issuers with no parent companies, we obtained the following BS and IS items
for the fiscal year 2015: earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), total revenue, cash from
operations, total assets, total liabilities, interest expenses, total debt, common equity and long-
term debt. In addition, we recorded the year in which the company had been founded. When no
data existed for the ultimate parent company, for instance due to it being a private company, we
obtained data for the parent on the highest level in the corporate structure for which data was
available. From the recorded data, we constructed the following variables: profitability (prof),
cash flow (cf), liquidity (liq), interest coverage (cov), leverage (lev), solvency (solv), size, age
and long-term debt (ltdebt). They are described in Table 1. We chose these variables as they
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are known to be determinants of credit quality (Blume et al., 1998; Mizen and Tsoukas, 2012).
Units for which we obtained anomalous variable values, suggesting erroneously recorded BS
or IS items, were excluded from the calculation of the summary statistics and the rest of the
analysis. More specifically, we excluded the bonds issued by companies for which interest
coverage exceeded 250 (3 companies), leverage exceeded 1 (3 companies) and solvency was
below -1 (1 company). These exclusions led to the removal of 29 bonds.
Table 1: Summary statistics for the issuer characteristics.
variable definition mean sd Q1 Q2 Q3 N
prof EBITtotal revenue 0.14 0.27 0.046 0.098 0.17 766
cf cash from operationstotal assets 0.055 0.095 0.033 0.067 0.096 699
liq cash from operationstotal liabilities 0.10 0.11 0.049 0.095 0.15 699
cov EBITinterest expenses 7.2 17 1.4 3.6 6.9 727
lev total debttotal assets 0.37 0.20 0.24 0.35 0.49 746
solv common equitytotal assets 0.29 0.20 0.17 0.28 0.41 756
size log(total revenue) 3.6 1.0 3.0 3.8 4.4 772
age 2017−year founded 77 76 22 61 115 709
ltdebt long-term debttotal assets 0.33 0.35 0.16 0.26 0.40 747
NOTES: The variable size is calculated with total revenue recorded in millions of euros.
In the following analysis, we restrict attention to bonds for which data about their coupon
rate, original maturity and all the characteristics of their issuers, i.e., the pretreatment variables,
is available. There are 591 such bonds, of which 29 are convertible, 351 callable and 211 bullet
bonds. However, the convertible bonds are not used in assessing the effect of the program as
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OAS is not available for them. In what follows, we denote by call the indicator variable equal
to 1 if the bond is callable and 0 otherwise.
4.2 Design
In the design phase, our first objective is to obtain a well-specified ordered probit model for
the running variable conditional on the pretreatment variables. In particular, we are concerned
about how well the ordered probit model predicts ratings around the BBB- eligibility thresh-
old. Good predictive power around the threshold ensures that the subset of units which we
ultimately employ to evaluate the program are close to the threshold in terms of their ratings.
Relying on substantive knowledge, we first include the economically most relevant pretreat-
ment variables which help predict ratings. This leads to the following seven variables: cpn, mat,
prof, cov, size, ltdebt and call. Then, we form all the possible interaction and quadratic terms
from these variables and include a combination of them which yields a model specification
with adequate predictive power.
To assess the predictive power of the model, we inspect how well it predicts the probability
of being assigned to the treatment group. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the estimated
propensity scores for each rating category. One observes that for high-yield bonds with a rat-
ing lower than BB and for investment-grade bonds with a rating higher than BBB the model
predicts them to be with a high probability in the control and in the treatment group, respec-
tively. Moreover, even for the four rating categories from BB to BBB around the threshold, the
model correctly predicts the treatment status of most units. Specifically, the estimated propen-
sity score is less than 0.5 for 60% of the BB+ and BB bonds. For the lowest investment-grade
categories BBB- and BBB, the estimated propensity scores is greater than 0.5 for 98% of the
bonds in these two categories. Most importantly, Figure 2 shows that all the bonds with esti-
mated propensity scores around 0.5 have ratings that are close to the investment grade threshold
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BBB-, suggesting the probit model is well specified.
Figure 2: Estimated propensity scores by rating.
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Our second objective in the design phase is to identify subsamples in which the distributions
of the covariates are balanced between the treatment and control groups. Following the proce-
dure in Section 2.2.3, we construct subsets of units in which the estimated propensity score of
each unit falls in the interval (0.5 − d, 0.5 + d), for some d. Then, in each subsample and for
each pretreatment variable, we assess covariate balance as measured by the standardized bias
(SB):
SB =
(∑N
i=1XiZiwi∑N
i=1 Ziwi
−
∑N
i=1Xi(1− Zi)wi∑N
i=1(1− Zi)wi
)/√
s20/N0 + s
2
1/N1,
where s2z is the sample variance of the unweighted covariate and Nz the sample size in group
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z = 0, 1. When each unit is assigned a weight of unity, the SB is simply the two-sample t-
statistic. We employ the unweighted standard errors in the denominator to be able to compare
the values of the statistic across different sets of weights. We first calculate the SB using the
overlap weights. Our goal is to find subsamples in which all the covariates are well balanced,
ensuring, at the same time, that the number of units in them is not too small. We identify five
such values of d, and present the corresponding SBs of the covariates in Panel A of Table 2.
All of the absolute values of the SBs are smaller than 1.96 (the critical value of the two-sample
t-statistic at 0.05 level), suggesting overall satisfactory covariate balance between the treatment
and control groups. This supports the plausibility of local unconfoundedness in the subsamples
under consideration.
We further investigate whether covariate balance is sensitive to the specific overlap weight-
ing scheme. Specifically, we calculate the SB for each covariate in each of the identified sub-
samples when employing instead the weights corresponding to the two alternative estimands of
our interest, ATE and ATT. The SBs obtained in this manner can be found in Panels B and C of
Table 2. For both the ATE and ATT weighting scheme, the covariates remain balanced in the
two subsamples with the fewest units. However, for the subsamples defined by d > 0.35, the
SBs of two covariates exceed 1.96 in absolute value, signaling that local unconfoundedness is
less likely to hold. For this reason, when we estimate the ATE and ATT, we focus on the first
two subsamples (d ∈ {0.34, 0.35}).
We also assess covariate balance in the five subsamples considered so far when all the units
are weighted equally. This allows us to evaluate whether applying the three sets of weights
materially improves covariate balance. That is, for each variable, we conduct a t-test for the
equality of the unweighted means of the variable in the two groups, the results of which are
shown in Panel D of Table 2. They indicate significant imbalance in some of the covariates.
Specifically, the t-statistics for cpn and solv exceed the relevant 5% critical values in all the five
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subsamples. Taken together, the results in Table 2 suggest that applying any of the three sets of
weights to the samples under consideration improves the overall covariate balance, even though
not for each individual covariate. The greatest improvement is observed when employing the
overlap weights. Note that, unlike in Li et al. (2018), here the balancing tests are conducted in
subsamples, while the weights are estimated using the whole sample. Consequently, covariate
balance is not an immediate consequence of applying the overlap weights.
Finally, we investigate whether covariate-balanced subsamples with a larger number of
units can be found by rendering asymmetric the intervals in which the estimated propensity
scores are required to lie. Specifically, for each of the three weighting schemes, we first identify
from Table 2 the largest value of d for which all the SBs are smaller than 1.96 in absolute
value, indicating satisfactory covariate balance. Then, starting from these symmetric intervals
(d = 0.38 for ATO and d = 0.35 for ATE and ATT), we gradually increase the length of the
interval on the right or left of 0.5 until significant imbalance emerges. In the case of both the
ATO and ATT weighting scheme, we are able to identify subsamples with a significantly larger
number of units, allowing us to more precisely estimate the effect of the program, as well as to
improve the external validity of our results.
4.3 Results
Having identified the subsamples in which local unconfoundedness plausibly holds, we can
proceed to estimate the average causal effect of being eligible for purchase under the CSPP for
the overlap population, namely the effect for units which could conceivably have been assigned
to either the treatment or control group. Specifically, we use the moment estimator τˆh in (4) for
point estimates and the M-estimator in (5) for standard errors.
Table 3 contains the estimated effects in the five covariate-balanced subsamples identified
above. The estimates of the ATO suggest that eligibility for purchase under the CSPP had a
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statistically significant and negative effect on bond spreads (a reduction in the range of 35–50
basis points). This is slightly lower than the 70 basis point reduction in the primary market
found by Zaghini (2019). However, the difference could simply reflect the more “local” nature
of our estimates compared to those in Zaghini (2019), which are based on all the bonds issued
in the primary market. Relative to the announcement effect of the program in the secondary
bond market, of 15 basis points according to Abidi and Flores (2017), our estimates are slightly
higher. This difference could reflect the higher liquidity of the bonds which are actively traded
in the secondary market.
Given the weighted average maturity of 7.5 years in the subsample defined by d = 0.38,
35–50 basis point reduction in yield to maturity corresponds approximately to a 2.6–3.8 per
cent increase in the price of a zero-coupon bond at issuance. Relative to the weighted aver-
age amount sold of 620 million euros in the subsample under consideration (d = 0.38), this
represents a significant decrease in the funding costs faced by the issuers of the eligible bonds.
As the effect of the program on bond spreads at issuance could have been due to higher
expected liquidity of the eligible bonds, it is instructive to compare the effect that we have
estimated to liquidity premia of corporate bonds. Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) estimate the liq-
uidity premia of BBB US corporate bonds to lie in the range of 4–93 basis points. Also relative
to these additional yields required by investors to compensate for the illiquidity of corporate
bonds, our estimates of the effect of the program are sizable.
We next examine how the estimates of the treatment effect vary when changing the target
population. Namely, we calculate the estimates of the ATE and ATT. The former refers to the
effect of the program for all units irrespective of their treatment status, without downweighting
units further away from the threshold. The latter, on the other hand, is the effect for the units
effectively treated. The estimates can be found in Table 3, along with those of the ATO. For
both the ATE and ATT, we only consider the first two subsamples, defined by d ∈ {0.34, 0.35},
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given that that covariate imbalance emerges for larger values of d. The results suggest that the
ATE is slightly larger in absolute value than the ATT. In other words, the effect of the program
on investment-grade bonds was slightly lower than the effect on high-yield bonds that would
have been observed had they also been treated.
The estimates of the ATO, ATE and ATT in Table 3 are based on subsamples which are
rather limited in size. For this reason, we estimate the effect of the program also when employ-
ing the subsamples defined by asymmetric intervals, identified in Section 4.2. The estimates
are presented in Table 4. The magnitude of the estimates change little when considering these
subsamples with a larger number of units. The estimates of the ATO appear to settle around
−45 basis points and the positive difference between the ATE and ATT decreases slightly. Not
surprisingly, the standard errors of the estimates decrease as the sample sizes grow.
4.4 Alternative approach
An influential alternative approach is due to Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) (AR hereafter),
who propose to identify causal effects away from the threshold by relying on a conditional
independence assumption. In particular, they leverage a set of predictors of the dependent
variable which does not contain the running variable. Conditional on this set of predictors,
potential outcomes are assumed to be mean-independent of the running variable. Given the
similarity between this and our local unconfoundedness assumption, we also estimate the ef-
fect of being eligible for purchase under the CSPP employing the framework of AR. Note that
the basic conditional independence assumption, E[Yi(zi)|Ri,Xi] = E[Yi(zi)|Xi], z = 0, 1,
is unlikely to be satisfied in our application. Therefore, we invoke their alternative assump-
tion, the bounded conditional independence assumption (BCIA): there exists d > 0 such that
E[Yi(zi)|Ri,Xi, |Ri − rt| < d] = E[Yi(zi)|Xi, |Ri − rt| < d], meaning that conditional mean-
independence holds in a d-neighborhood of the threshold.
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However, the measure of distance in the definition of the BCIA is not directly applicable
to ordinal running variables. Instead, we take advantage of the ordered nature of the running
variable and identify the set of units around the threshold as those with a rating BB+ (the high-
est category in the control group) or BBB- (the lowest category in the treatment group). We
then assume that conditional independence holds in this subset of units around the threshold.
Moreover, AR propose to assess the BCIA by testing the coefficients in regressions of the out-
come on the running variable and the pretreatment variables on either side of the threshold.
This procedure is however not applicable to our selected subsample because we are only con-
sidering one category on each side of the threshold. Therefore, we cannot assess the validity of
the conditional independence assumption in our subsample.
AR propose to identify the subset of units to analyze based on the value of the running
variable. In our application, this leads to the subsample of all bonds whose rating is either BB+
(43 units) or BBB- (26 units). Based on this sample we find the WLS estimate is -36.7 (p-value
0.367) with ATT weights and -51.8 (p-value 0.205) with ATE weights. These estimates are in
line with those obtained using our framework, even though the two approaches rely on rather
different assumptions. However, the covariate distribution of this subsample can be imbalanced
between the treated and the control groups; indeed, in our case, nearly all 12 covariates have
larger SB than in our method, 4 of which are larger than 1.96. This speaks to a strength
of our approach: we define the candidate subsamples based on richer covariate information,
encoded in the estimated propensity scores obtained from the ordered probit model, and thus
help identify subsets of units with better covariate balance between the treated and the control
groups. Covariate balance lends powerful support to the validity of local unconfoundedness,
being a stronger consequence of this assumption than the regression independence assessed by
AR.
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5 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper we have developed a regression discontinuity design applicable when the running
variable, determining assignment to treatment, is ordinal. The estimation strategy is based on
the following steps. We first estimate an ordered probit model for the ordinal running variable
conditional on pretreatment variables. The estimated probability of being assigned to treatment
is then adopted as a continuous surrogate running variable. In order to provide external validity
to the analysis, we move away from the standard inference at the threshold by assuming local
unconfoundedness of the treatment in an interval around the surrogate threshold. Then, once
this interval has been identified via an overlap-weighted balancing assessment of the prepro-
gram variables across treatments, an estimate of the effect of the program in the interval is
obtained employing a weighted estimator of the average treatment effect.
We have applied our methodology to estimate the causal effect of the European Central
Bank’s Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) on corporate bond spreads. We have
estimated the effect of the program in a subpopulation defined by the estimated conditional
probability to be eligible for purchase. This subpopulation is composed of bonds that can be
assigned with non-negligible probability to either eligibility status, and therefore are the most
affected by, even small, changes in the program. Our results suggest that eligibility for purchase
under the CSPP had a negative effect, in the order of 35–50 basis points, on bond spreads at
issuance. This is somewhat higher than previous estimates of the announcement effect of the
program on bonds traded in the secondary market (Abidi and Flores, 2017). Given that in the
sample which is used to conduct inference the average amount issued exceeded 600 million
euros, the 35–50 basis point reduction in the yield to maturity corresponds to a non-negligible
decrease in the funding costs of the eligible issuers.
There are several limitations of our work. First, though our probit specification appears to
perform well in the empirical application, it may be improved by a more objective procedure for
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choosing it. Specifically, our approach may give rise to a trade-off between variance and bias.
Namely, when the model for the ordinal variable provides a good in-sample fit, the estimated
propensity scores of most units are close to either 0 or 1. Consequently, covariate-balanced
subsamples, identified using the estimated propensity scores, are likely to have moderate sam-
ple sizes. This may lead to elevated standard errors of the estimates of the treatment effect. One
direction is to develop a cross-validation criterion based on an objective function that achieves
the right balance between bias and variance. Another direction is to conduct some sensitivity
analysis on the model specification, e.g., in the vein of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Second,
it is possible that our analysis captures not only the causal effect of the CSPP program but also
the effect related to the rating of the bond. To be able to attribute the effects to the program, one
possibility is to conduct a negative control analysis (Rosenbaum, 2002). That is, to evaluate the
effect of eligibility on spreads during a pretreatment period (i.e., “no treatment” evaluation) to
assess the potential effect due to the rating of the bond. Third, our method relies partially on
the local SUTVA assumption, which rules out interference between units as well as any “exter-
nality effects”. One could borrow from the recent advances to tackle the interference problem
in causal inference to relax this assumption.
Appendix
Derivation of the M-estimator of variance in Section 2.2.4. The log likelihood function of
the ordered probit model (1) is
l(η) =
N∑
i=1
li(η) =
N∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
wij(log[Φ(uj − xTi β)− Φ(uj−1 − xTi β)])
where wij = I(Ri = rj), u0 = −∞, uJ = ∞. Maximum likelihood estimates of the model
parameters are obtained by solving the score function (first-order derivative of the log likeli-
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hood),
0 = S(η) ≡
N∑
i=1
Si(η) ≡
N∑
i=1
∂
∂η
li(η) =
N∑
i=1
(
∂
∂u1
li(η), · · · , ∂
∂uJ−1
li(η),
∂
∂βT
li(η))
T .
Let Eηη = −E[ ∂2∂η2 li(η)] be the informatiom matrix, the stochastic expansion for es-
timating η is then
√
N(ηˆ − η) = E−1ηη 1√N
∑N
i=1 Si(η) + op(1). The propensity score is
e(Xi) = Pr(Z = 1|Xi) = 1 − Pr(Ri ≤ rt−1|Xi) = 1 − Φ(ut−1 −XTi β), and its gradient
is eη = ∂e(Xi)/∂η = ( ∂e∂u1 , · · · , ∂e∂uJ−1 , ∂e∂βT )T . Recall the moment estimator with estimated
overlap weights is
τˆow = τˆ1 − τˆ0 =
∑
ZiYi(1− eˆi)∑N
i=1 Zi(1− eˆi)
−
∑N
i=1(1− Zi)Yieˆi∑N
i=1(1− Zi)eˆi
.
From this, we can view τˆ1 as the solution to the unbiased estimating equation
∑N
i=1 Zi(1 −
eˆi)(Yi− τˆ1) = 0. Denote θ = E[e(Xi)(1− e(Xi))], we expand the estimating equation around
τ1 = θ
−1E(e(Xi)(1−e(Xi))µ1(Xi)) and the true propensity score ei to obtain
√
N(τˆ1−τ1) =
θ−1[ 1√
N
∑N
i=1 Zi(Yi − τ1)(1− ei)− E(Zi(Yi − τ1)eη)T
√
N(ηˆ − η)] + op(1). Similarly, if we
define τ0 = θ−1E(e(Xi)(1 − e(Xi))µ0(Xi)), we have
√
N(τˆ0 − τ0) = θ−1[ 1√N
∑N
i=1(1 −
Zi)(Yi − τ0)ei + E((1− Zi)(Yi − τ0)eη)T
√
N(ηˆ − η)] + op(1).
Differencing the above two expansions we obtain
√
N(τˆow − τow) = θ−1[ 1√
N
[
N∑
i=1
Zi(Yi − τ1)(1− ei)− (1− Zi)(Yi − τ0)ei]−
HTη
√
N(ηˆ − η)] + op(1) = θ−1 1√
N
N∑
i=1
Ii + op(1)
where Ii = Zi(Yi − τ1)(1− ei)− (1− Zi)(Yi − τ0)ei −HTηE−1ηη Si(η) andHη = E[Zi(Yi −
τ1)eη + (1− Zi)(Yi − τ0)eη)]. Replacing the expectation by its empirical counterpart leads to
the empirical sandwich variance estimator in Section 2.2.4.
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Table 2: Standardized bias of the covariates when 0.5− d < eˆ(xi) < 0.5 + d.
d N cpn mat prof cf liq cov lev solv size age ltdebt call
Panel A. ATO weights
0.34 27 −1.31 1.19 1.06 0.97 1.51 0.52 −0.28 1.26 −1.89 −1.76 −0.34 −0.43
0.35 28 −1.43 1.38 0.75 0.81 1.45 0.37 −0.34 1.40 −1.74 −1.39 −0.45 −0.40
0.36 32 −1.59 1.65 0.83 0.62 1.40 0.52 −0.69 1.68 −1.66 −1.17 −0.80 −0.38
0.37 33 −1.76 1.74 0.85 0.38 1.18 0.45 −0.17 1.34 −1.72 −1.31 −0.23 −0.36
0.38 36 −1.29 1.84 1.03 0.72 1.54 0.40 0.12 1.75 −1.89 −1.07 0.01 −0.40
Panel B. ATE weights
0.34 27 −1.64 0.97 0.94 0.77 1.51 0.59 −0.48 1.52 −1.64 −1.50 −0.65 −0.61
0.35 28 −1.77 1.33 0.53 0.55 1.39 0.36 −0.55 1.69 −1.42 −1.05 −0.79 −0.56
0.36 32 −1.96 1.81 0.62 0.26 1.26 0.56 −1.05 2.05 −1.24 −0.64 −1.30 −0.52
0.37 33 −2.23 1.88 1.04 −0.07 0.94 0.43 −0.24 1.53 −1.53 −0.88 −0.37 −0.47
0.38 36 −1.30 1.94 1.29 0.56 1.53 0.37 0.28 2.13 −1.74 −0.46 0.08 −0.53
Panel C. ATT weights
0.34 27 −1.40 1.00 1.03 0.57 1.42 0.50 −0.08 1.39 −1.80 −1.53 −0.35 −0.57
0.35 28 −1.50 1.46 0.54 0.33 1.26 0.21 −0.11 1.54 −1.56 −1.02 −0.46 −0.48
0.36 32 −1.51 2.09 0.54 0.01 1.07 0.33 −0.47 1.81 −1.33 −0.69 −0.79 −0.33
0.37 33 −1.83 2.17 1.15 −0.35 0.70 0.15 0.32 1.23 −1.72 −1.01 0.13 −0.25
0.38 36 −0.39 2.18 1.46 0.75 1.69 0.24 0.99 2.14 −1.92 −0.30 0.71 −0.45
Panel D. Unitary weights
0.34 27 −2.37 0.69 0.75 0.35 1.40 0.92 −1.37 2.12 −0.96 −0.85 −1.63 −0.97
0.35 28 −2.52 1.19 0.28 0.10 1.24 0.65 −1.47 2.31 −0.70 −0.36 −1.80 −0.91
0.36 32 −2.76 1.78 0.43 −0.22 1.09 0.92 −2.10 2.72 −0.51 0.17 −2.43 −0.87
0.37 33 −3.05 1.83 1.10 −0.58 0.73 0.77 −0.92 2.07 −1.00 −0.14 −1.08 −0.82
0.38 36 −2.95 1.81 1.27 −0.57 0.80 0.51 −0.74 2.46 −1.10 0.10 −0.94 −0.76
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Table 3: Estimates of the weighted treatment effect. Symmetric intervals.
d N0 N1 estimate se (p-val.)
Panel A. ATO
0.34 10 17 −37.1 23.6 (0.116)
0.35 11 17 −39.5 23.1 (0.088)
0.36 13 19 −42.7 21.4 (0.046)
0.37 14 19 −45.9 21.1 (0.029)
0.38 16 20 −38.4 23.1 (0.096)
Panel B. ATE
0.34 10 17 −42.2 23.2 (0.069)
0.35 11 17 −45.3 22.5 (0.044)
Panel C. ATT
0.34 10 17 −36.4 27.6 (0.186)
0.35 11 17 −39.9 26.2 (0.128)
NOTES: Nz is the sample size of group z.
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Table 4: Estimates of the weighted treatment effect. Asymmetric intervals.
eˆmin eˆmax N0 N1 estimate se (p-val.)
Panel A. ATO
0.10 0.88 21 16 −39.6 22.8 (0.082)
0.09 0.88 23 16 −41.3 22.3 (0.064)
0.08 0.88 24 16 −42.7 22.1 (0.054)
0.07 0.88 27 16 −44.8 21.5 (0.037)
0.06 0.88 29 16 −45.0 21.2 (0.033)
0.05 0.88 31 16 −45.5 20.9 (0.029)
Panel B. ATE
0.15 0.86 17 13 −48.0 21.1 (0.023)
Panel C. ATT
0.13 0.85 19 11 −40.6 25.7 (0.114)
0.11 0.85 20 11 −41.2 25.5 (0.106)
0.09 0.85 22 11 −42.2 25.2 (0.094)
0.08 0.85 23 11 −43.0 25.1 (0.087)
0.07 0.85 26 11 −44.2 24.8 (0.074)
0.06 0.85 28 11 −44.3 24.6 (0.071)
NOTES: Nz is the sample size of group z.
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